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European institutions and governments have come in for a lot of critique over the
past few years. Sometimes such critiques have seemed unfair and hypocritical, in
particular where those who criticize are no role models either (e.g. the European
Union). And judging on a case-by-case basis, some the actions of the Polish or
Hungarian governments seem perhaps not that extraordinary. Yet, once we look
at the whole, a different picture emerges. As Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq have
argued in their recent book How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, democracies
can erode where we see changes with regard to three fields key to preserving
democracy: free and fair elections, liberal rights of speech and association (the
public sphere) and the rule of law and the institutions enforcing it, i.e. courts and the
administration. In Hungary and Poland, we see changes in all of these areas and this
should worry us.
On November 13-14, the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and the Verfassungsblog
took up the challenge to look at all of these three issues together. The overarching
question? How resilient would German constitutionalism and its institutions prove in
response to the kind of challenges Polish and Hungarian institutions have confronted
in recent years? I participated for the Verfassungsblog in the panel sessions on
judicial institutions and report on them here (following Chatham house rules). In
brief: The news is both good and bad. There is room and indeed a strong case for
making some changes in Germany. In particular with regard to concrete rules and
arrangements, Germany is surprisingly ill-equipped to handle potential populist
assault on judicial institutions. At the same time, much suggests that the broader
German democratic and legal cultural background supports a relatively high degree
of institutional resilience, even if politics should shift further into a populist direction.
Many parts of the Polish and Hungarian stories are well known, and I do not want
to rehash them here in detail. A short summary seems appropriate, however
(skip if you are familiar with the details, read Kriszta Kovács and Kim Scheppele
here if you want a more detailed account): Broadly speaking, both the Polish and
Hungarian government have pursued comprehensive strategies of both capturing
and weakening judicial and oversight institutions in the last decade. It is important
to note, that these strategies are by no means confined to constitutional courts, the
issue most discussed in the European press, but have targeted judicial institutions
more broadly, affecting both their “de jure and de facto independence”.
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To capture institutions, older judges have sometimes been forced into early
retirement and younger (and loyal) ones hired, as in the recent 2018 Polish reform
(targeting both Supreme Court Justices as well as those at ordinary courts) and
Hungary’s 2012 reform of the judiciary which forced 274 judges into retirement.
1)See CJEU, Commission v. Hungary, C#286/12 on this. For more see Halmai,
Gábor, The Early Retirement Age of the Hungarian Judges (June 12, 2017)
and Gábor Halmai, The Early Retirement Age of the Hungarian Judges, in EU
Law Stories: Contextual and Critical Histories of European Jurisprudence (eds.,
Fernanda and Davis), Cambridge University Press, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2985219. And both in Hungary and Poland “disloyal” judges
are increasingly threatened with disciplinary sanctions. Key to such controls are
national oversight institutions, including court presidents and prosecutors. Recent
Polish reforms have enabled the government to exchange court presidents and
fill new appointment. A parliamentary three-fifths majority can appoint candidates
to the National Council of the Judiciary, an oversight institution important with
regard to new hires etc.2) Anna Sledzinska-Simon, The Rise and Fall of Judicial
Self-Government in Poland: On Judicial Reform Reversing Democratic Transition
(June 30, 2018) in: The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Government in Europe
(David Kosa# ed.), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3216482 or http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3216482 In Hungary, the government early on installed
a new oversight institution, the National Office for the Judiciary, headed by a
Fidesz supporter (Tünde Handó) who holds key responsibilities with regard to the
appointment of court presidents, judicial administration and new appointments, with
the National Committee of Justice (which suffers from a number of organizational
deficits) being largely sidelined.3)https://verfassungsblog.de/judges-under-attack-
in-hungary/ Add to this increasing governmental influence on legal education and
governmental smear campaigns against individual judges as well as attempts
to overhaul the administrative court system with reference to the German (!)
example.4)I am grateful to Kriszta Kovacs for pointing this out to me.
Both in Poland and Hungary, changes have also been made with regard to the
prosecution agencies, albeit in rather different manner. In Poland, recent reforms
have merged the function of Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General who holds
the power to demote prosecutors (according to estimates roughly 1500) and promote
and appoint others. In addition, courts have been obliged to accept illegally obtained
evidence and prosecutors may escape disciplinary liability if they can show that their
actions were in the interest of the case pursued. Though formally independent, the
staffing of the Chief Prosecutor’s Office with Fidesz loyalists has led to similar results
in Hungary. Though Hungarian prosecutors mostly do not yet seem to use their
power as aggressively as their Turkish counterparts who have been arresting and
jailing political opponents and civil society activists, they have also been reluctant to
investigate massive cases of governmental corruption, even in cases where other
institutions strongly recommended proceedings.
In addition, both the Polish and Hungarian governments have sought to curtail
the power of some judicial institutions. In the Hungarian case, the Constitutional
Court was early on stripped of its power to exercise constitutional review over
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budgetary and tax issues. In Poland, the government refused for some time to
publish judgments of the Constitutional Court. Since its capture it is now attempting
to use the Court to declare Art. 267 TFEU unconstitutional “to the extent that it allows
referring to the Court [of Justice] a preliminary question … in matters pertaining to
the design, shape, and organisation of the judiciary”.[5)https://verfassungsblog.de/
will-poland-with-its-own-constitution-ablaze-now-set-fire-to-eu-law/5] But quite apart
from such straightforward attempts to curtail judicial power, the broader attacks on
judges also contribute to weakening courts in the longer run. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
the discussion suggested that not all factors that contribute to weaken judicial
authority are of recent vintage. Several commentators, however, also argued that the
weakness of courts to resist governmental measures was linked to the preservation
of a formalist style of legal interpretation to the exclusion of broader and more
principle-oriented styles of judicial argument, a heritage of the communist era.
Where does all this leave us and what are the lessons for the Germany? The first
one is simple and straightforward: Constitutionalize key norms that secure judicial
independence and at least a certain degree of prosecutorial independence. The
appointment of judges is generally a matter of Länder competence in Germany
and accordingly, different institutions are responsible for the selection of suitable
candidates including the respective ministers of justice, courts or a mix of both.
This state of affairs as well as the lacking independence of German prosecutorial
agencies have been the subject of repeated criticism and reformist zeal in
the past – without much success, however. In particular, a suggestion by die
Linke in 2013 to amend the Basic Law with a clause providing for judicial self-
government did not attract sufficient support. Indeed, it has been suggested by
the German Judges Union (Richterbund) that as a matter of constitutional law
comprehensive judicial self-government might be incompatible with the principle
of democracy. Though this is not the place to rehash that debate in its entirety,
the constitutional argument would presumably be weaker if there was some
parliamentary involvement, potentially along the lines of the appointment of
constitutional court judges, i.e. requiring a supermajority for appointment (a fairly
obvious candidate for constitutionalization). Requiring cooperation among major
political parties can, of course, be a recipe for partisan gridlock. At the same time,
when they do work, consensual mechanisms provide a nice counter-point to the
divisive us-and-them rhetoric of populists. All this is not to say that constitutionally
enshrined self-government of the judiciary or prosecution will be a panacea against
all attempts to capture a judiciary, but it might help to slow down capture should it
come to that. Last but not least, it would also deprive other European governments
of the opportunity to refer to the German case to make the case that their own
arrangements, similar to the German ones, surely pose no problem.
With several contributors pointing to the importance of broader background
conditions for the robustness of judicial institutions, the workshop also held some
good news. Long held styles of legal arguments, the entrenchment of European
and international law within domestic legal systems, independent law schools
and the organization of legal training more broadly play a considerable role for
reinforcing judicial independence and the protection of human rights. Influencing
such background conditions is, of course, not an enterprise of a few years but rather
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of decades of combined efforts by lawyers, law teachers and political actors. When
it comes to Germany, the good news is that many of these supporting background
factors are in place: a purposive and principled style of legal argument, significant
influence of constitutional and European law on domestic law and their integration in
law school curricula as well as a fairly rigorous system of legal education that may
help reinforce legal expertise as a relatively independent source of authority and
doctrine as a mainstream language that can be shared across the political spectrum.
Naturally, there is room for improvement: Contextualizing doctrinal arguments in
public law may help law students to better understand how law and politics connect
and take seriously the role of law in sustaining democracy. Similarly, we might
think about integrating European law and human rights more strongly still within the
standard curriculum rather than teaching them as separate classes (as some law
faculties including my home institution in Münster are starting to do).
Ultimately, however, the workshop also reinforced an old lesson we tend to forget:
that the power of law and lawyers is limited and that nothing replaces democratic
action on the streets, within political parties and for electoral campaigns.
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